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Lake Kivu’s methane gas: natural risk, or source of  
energy and political security?1 
 
 
or a long time Lake Kivu’s huge methane gas reserves had only inter-
ested limnologists or geoscientists because of the uniqueness of the 
physico-chemical composition of the lake water. In January 2002 during the 
eruption of the Nyiragongo volcano on the northern, Congolese shore of the 
lake, a voluminous lava stream entered the lake. This event highlighted once 
again the dangers connected with the presence of dissolved gases in the 
water which evoked the deadly gas outburst of Lake Nyos in Cameroon that 
killed nearly 2000 people in 1986 (Tietze 1987). Because of its current energy 
crisis, and driven by the vision of having an almost inexhaustible source of 
power, Rwanda increased its efforts to establish the first worldwide large-
scale exploitation of dissolved methane gas. Hence, new aspects of Lake 
Kivu’s methane reserves have emerged that centre around the sensitive 
geopolitical question of the use of a common resource shared by the former 
warring parties, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This 
question becomes even more delicate in view of the plundering of the DRC’s 
natural resources during the wars of the last decade. 
This article will therefore first analyse the current energy crisis and its 
political implications in Rwanda and in the eastern DRC, and sketch the 
origin of methane in Lake Kivu as well as associated natural risks. After a 
presentation of current methane gas extraction projects in Rwanda and an 
analysis of the institutional framework, a discussion of the potentials, prob-
lems and risks of methane gas exploitation in a post-conflict environment 
will conclude the paper. 
 
 
                                            
1  Fieldwork was carried out in October 2006. The author conducted numerous interviews 






The energy crisis in Rwanda and eastern DRC 
 
Rwanda and the eastern part of the DRC2 are currently facing a serious en-
ergy crisis. Since most of the electricity produced is generated through hy-
dropower, the highly variable climate in central Africa and man-made dis-
turbances of the hydrological cycle expose the power systems to great fluc-
tuation. 
Low rainfall is the immediate cause of Rwanda’s current gravest elec-
tricity crisis since its independence in 1962. Although there is also a lack of 
investment in Rwanda – no new generating plant has been constructed since 
1982 – increasingly significant power cuts are mainly due to the poor per-
formance of the country’s most important hydroelectric plants, Ntaruka and 
Mukunga, in the hills of the Northern Province (former Ruhengeri prov-
ince). With a production of normally 23 MW these two plants provide nearly 
half of Rwanda’s power.  
Since 2004, low lake-water levels due to highly variable rainfall and 
higher evapotranspiration due to deforestation in combination with strong 
growth of demand (average GDP rate of 8% a year since 1995), exacerbated 
by high technical losses and the unreliability of the dilapidated grid, have 
led to frequent power cuts. The current energy deficit is estimated at 30 MW. 
With support of the World Bank, the Rwandan government purchased new 
diesel generation capacity, which has now eased the crisis, at least in Kigali. 
To cover the costs of diesel imports, the government continues to increase 
power tariffs, which have trebled since 2004.3 This landlocked country im-
ports all petroleum products either by truck from Mombasa or through the 
Mombasa-Nairobi-Kisumu pipeline, and it is feared that high energy costs 
will affect the booming economy as a whole. 
To make up for the shortfall and to cover its minimal energy needs of 
about 45 MW, the country depends on two additional hydropower plants 
which were constructed on the Ruzizi River, which runs along the border 
with the neighbouring DRC. The Ruzizi 1 plant (28 MW) is run by the Société 
Nationale d’Électricité (SNEL), a Congolese government-owned utility that 
contracted to deliver power to Rwanda at a preferential price.4 The Ruzizi 2 
hydropower station (29 MW) is operated by Société Internationale d’Electricité 
                                            
2  For the purposes of this article (data availability, interconnected power grid), the eastern 
part of the DRC includes the provinces of Kivu-Sud and Kivu-Nord. 
3  In December 2006 people paid €0.17 per kWh which is one of the highest rates in the 
world (Financial Times Dec. 5, 2006, online: <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/f77916c6-8405-
11db-9e95-0000779e2340.html>, accessed 08.12.2006). 
4  Eastern DRC’s power grid has been interconnected with the grids of Rwanda and Bu-
rundi since colonial times. 
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des Pays de Grands Lacs (SINELAC), a joint venture of Electrogaz, Rwanda’s 
state-owned electricity supplier, Burundi’s Régie de Production et Distribution 
d’Eau et d’Electricité (Regideso) and SNEL. The main customer for power 
from the two plants is Rwanda to whom these capacities are especially im-
portant for providing Kigali with electricity. 
However, both plants use the water from Lake Kivu, which drains to 
Lake Tanganyika via the Ruzizi River, and, like in northern Rwanda, a fal-
ling water level has been observed in Lake Kivu since 2003. Normally the 
Ruzizi 1 plant is able to regulate the water level of Lake Kivu at between 
1463 m and 1462 m above sea level. But in October 2006 it fell to 1461.61 m, 
which is already critical.5 An aggravating factor is that one generator is not 
functional. As a consequence, only 11 MW were produced by Ruzizi 1 at the 
end of 2006 and if the water level continues to sink the plant risks being shut 
down, with serious consequences for an entire region depending completely 
on hydroelectricity.6 Steadily decreasing water levels in Lake Kivu are 
caused by a combination of climatic driving forces and the impact of a series 
of earthquakes that accompanied the eruption of the volcano Nyiragongo in 
January 2002.7 In addition to climatic and tectonic factors, extreme wear and 
lack of maintenance of the existing power generating installations in the 
eastern part of the DRC can be observed. Thus, hydro stations exhibit a 45% 
deficit in production, while some small thermal stations continue to suffer 
from shortages of fuel and plundering (Nile Basin Initiative 2005: 2-20). In 
October 2006 there were long daily power cuts in the city of Goma because 
of electricity rationing. Whereas the city needs at least 9 MW, Ruzizi 1 pro-
vides merely 3 or 4. Only hospitals and water supply facilities were con-
stantly supplied, having been given  priority.  
In view of the urgency of security issues in the current transformation 
phase, the Congolese authorities don’t see ending power breakdowns as a 
top priority at the moment. The directors of SNEL, as well as politicians, are 
hoping for short-term donor-funding for the rehabilitation of Ruzizi 1, and 
have long-term plans for new interconnections and an extension of hydro-
                                            
5  Author’s interview with staff members of SNEL in Goma and Bukavu, October 2006. 
6  Author’s interview with Director of SNEL in Goma, October 2006. 
7  Ground subsidence is an ongoing phenomenon in the entire rift area near Lake Kivu. In 
January 2002 first measurements by the Goma Volcanic Observatory (GVO) along the 
northern shoreline from Gisenyi to Sake showed significant ground subsidence: -37 cm in 
Goma and -10 cm in Gisenyi. One month later maximum measured ground subsidence was 
50-60 cm in Goma (Baxter 2002; Tedesco et al 2002; Global Volcanism Program: Nyiragongo, 
Monthly Reports 2002, online: <http//www.volcano.si.edu/world/volcano.cfm?vnum=02 




power, for which there is a huge potential in the DRC.8 At present there are 
no plans in the DRC for power generation using methane gas which is rather 
seen as a future energy reserve. 
The situation in Rwanda is totally different: in view of the over-reliance 
on energy imports, the dependency on declining hydropower performance, 
and the lack of sustainable options for expanding existing hydroelectricity 
capacities, the government is feverishly seeking alternatives. At present it is 
unable to cope with past levels of demand, let alone the sharp growth in 
demand of 15% per year that has arisen out of economic growth fired par-
ticularly by a boom in the construction sector. If the Rwandan leadership 
wants to legitimate itself as a guarantor of progress and economic growth, it 
has to provide affordable energy. As already mentioned, diesel generation as 
an immediate practical solution to the energy crisis is adding to the eco-
nomic burden on the country. In addition to this, only 5% of the population 
is connected to the grid, with 60% of those connected living in Kigali. Ninety 
percent of Rwanda’s 8.1 million people live in rural areas, where electricity 
provision is still more or less non-existent. Rural electrification would be an 
effective option for handling the growing, though silent, dissatisfaction with 
the concentration of development efforts on Kigali. 
In this situation the reserves of methane gas in Lake Kivu are seen as an 
enormous but unused energy source and as a sustainable solution to the 
country's energy problems. Projects to exploit these resources have top pri-
ority for the government at the moment. 
 
 
Methane in Lake Kivu as natural risk 
 
As part of the western branch of the African rift valley, Lake Kivu was 
formed about 500,000 years ago in the course of the emergence of the 
Virunga volcano chain. It reaches depths of more than 450 m, comprises part 
of the border between Rwanda and the DRC and covers a surface area of 
about 2400 km², distributed almost equally between the two countries. The 
lake is unique in the world because its deeper waters contain an enormous 
quantity of dissolved gas: estimates range from 250 billion m³ of carbon 
dioxide (CO2) and 50 to 55 billion m³ of methane gas (CH4).9  
                                            
8  Planners especially discuss investments in the Inga complex on the Congo River in 
western DRC that is said to have a potential of 39,000 MW (Marot, 2003). 
9  Dissolved gases in Lake Kivu were first described in the 1930s. It also contains 5 billion 
m³ of nitrogen and traces of many other gases. Numerous scientific studies have confirmed 
the huge reserves of methane since the 1950s (see for example Tietze 1978 and Halbwachs 
et al. 2002). 
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Lake Kivu:  methane gas deposits and the  







Though not fully known the lake’s carbon dioxide seems to be partly of 
volcanic origin as well as formed by the decomposition and fermentation of 
organic material by anaerobic bacteria accumulating in the bottom sediment. 
Methane is generated by fermentation processes and by the reduction of 
volcanic carbon dioxide by the same bacteria (Tietze et al. 1980). It is esti-
mated that 100 to 150 million m³ of methane are generated annually in the 
lake. Like other lakes the waters of Lake Kivu show a stratified structure 
with stable horizontal homogenous layers which have different physical and 
chemical properties. The highest concentrations of carbon dioxide and 
methane were measured in layers below the depth of 270 m where high-
density gradients prevent any mixing phenomena, thus facilitating the gas 
accumulation.  
There are only two other lakes in the world containing similar concen-
trations of dissolved gas: Lake Monoun and Lake Nyos in Cameroon. In 
1986, a CO2 outburst from Lake Nyos killed 1800 people who died of as-
phyxiation. The dissolved gas had reached saturation level, so that an un-
controlled ex-solution process began,10 and, as inside an opened bottle of 
champagne, when the pressure fell, bubbles rose to the surface, drawing up 
the water with them and triggering a chain reaction that resulted in the 
deadly gas outburst. An enormous quantity of carbon dioxide was liberated, 
killing people and animals in the surrounding valleys (Tietze 1987).  
In its normal state the stratification of Lake Kivu is stable. The gas con-
centrations have not yet reached the dangerous magnitudes of Lake Nyos, 
let alone a saturation level that could lead to a gas outburst.11 But even if the 
carbon dioxide concentrations are much lower, a risk remains for the popu-
lation of about two million people living on Lake Kivu’s shores, due to the 
presence of dissolved methane. Simulations of physical mixing in the lake 
show that if the current methane production remains stable a dangerous 
concentration of the gas composition could be reached in about hundred 
years. But this time span will diminish if methane production within the 
sediment continues to increase at the rate measured recently (Schmid et al. 
2004, 2005). Lake Kivu contains a thousand times more gas than Lake Nyos, 
and since the methane accounts for more than 4/5 of the total gases in Lake 
Kivu, it is feared that it will function as a ‘detonator’ for the enormous 
quantity of carbon dioxide.  
                                            
10  Ex-solution means the formation of gas bubbles in an over-saturated liquid. In the case 
of a lake the saturation limit of the waters depends on the total quantity of dissolved gas 
and the pressure (depth). Ex-solution occurs when the sum of partial pressures of all dis-
solved gases reaches hydrostatic pressure. 
11  Measurements showed saturation levels of 57% for methane at a depth of 290 m and 8% 
for carbon dioxide at 280 m depth (Halbwachs et al. 2002: 2). 
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Furthermore, the current stability of the lake is threatened by distinct 
seismic and volcanic activity in the region. The January 2002 eruption of the 
volcano Nyiragongo, probably caused by a tectonic fracture between the ac-
tive plates of the African Rift Valley, destroyed large parts of the city of 
Goma, situated on the north-western shore of Lake Kivu. Since one of the 
huge lava streams with a width of 600 m ran through the city centre and 
entered the lake, the people in Goma and neighbouring Gisenyi in Rwanda 
feared that the hot lava could have disturbed the stability of the lake, thus 
making a future gas outburst even more likely. Immediate investigations 
showed that the one million m³ of lava only reached a depth between 70 and 
100 m and that the disturbances of the water stratification were limited to a 
depth of 120 m. This was distant enough from those layers with the highest 
gas concentrations but if a stronger lava inflow reaches depths below 250 m 
in the future a serious situation could build up (Halbwachs et al. 2002: 8-23). 
Since there are numerous volcanic cones at the bottom of the northern basin, 
Schmid et al. (n.p.: 15/17) investigated the potential impact of heat input in 
the deep waters. They concluded that such an input must be exceptionally 
strong to trigger a gas outburst but that ‘the required heat input will 
strongly decline if the dissolved gas concentrations further increase in the 
future’. 
In respect of the debate on the risk constituted by dissolved gases in 
Lake Kivu, we can say that the present possibility of a massive gas outburst 
is low, provided no significant disturbance occurs, such as a very strong heat 
input into the lake. However, to reduce the remaining risk of such an event, 
which could have a devastating impact on the entire Lake Kivu catchment 
area of 10,000 km²; scientists postulate a controlled degassing of the lake, as 
has been carried out in Cameroon (Schmid et al. 2003). But, contrary to the 
case of Lake Monoun and Lake Nyos, where carbon dioxide is released into 
the atmosphere, the focus here is on methane gas extraction for the purpose 
of power generation and is thus linked to concrete economic interests. 
 
 
Current projects for methane gas extraction in Rwanda  
 
The first and, up to now, the only operational industrial exploitation of Lake 
Kivu’s methane is the Cap Rubona Power Station, near Gisenyi on the 
Rwandan shore of the lake. It was built in 1963 by Union Chimique Belge not 
far from a local brewery that uses the gas as fuel. Planned to operate as a 




purified methane per day to the brewery.12 Cap Rubona Power Station is 
managed today by the Unité pour la Promotion et l'Exploitation du Gaz du Lac 
Kivu (UPEGAZ), a body within the Rwandan Ministry of Infrastructure. Its 
success led to numerous studies on the technical, economical and environ-
mental feasibility of a large-scale exploitation of Lake Kivu’s methane, which 
also address the possible applications such as power generation, vehicle fuel, 
a substitute for firewood and various chemical applications.13 
As one example of current projects for methane gas extraction one has 
to mention Dane Associates Limited (DANE), a special-purpose company 
registered in Scotland and trading locally as ‘Kibuye Power 1 Limited’ 
(KP1). The plan is to build a new power plant near the district town of 
Kibuye that will use methane from Lake Kivu.14 The World Bank has 
granted a risk guarantee to KP1, a public private partnership between 
DANE and the Rwandan government, which is contributing 30% to cover 
the estimated costs of about 60 million Euros. In March 2005, DANE and the 
government of Rwanda signed a gas concession agreement and a power 
purchase agreement. After an expanded testing phase for the upgraded gas 
extraction technology, it is hoped that KP1 will produce 35 MW to be in-
jected into the national power grid and sold by Electrogaz, which will buy it 
from KP1 at about 0.05 € per kWh.15 It is hoped that the additional quantity 
of cheaper power will reduce the cost of electricity in Rwanda by 50%.16 The 
economic performance of KP1 is being closely watched by a group of Rwan-
                                            
12  The technology of gas production in Cap Rubona is relatively simple: water from a 
depth of around 300 m is conducted to a separator under the lake surface through two 
pipes. When pressure becomes progressively lower the gases come out of the solution. The 
separator then liberates more gas and separates it from the already partially degassed 
water. The resulting gas mixture of about 70% carbon dioxide and 30% methane is en-
riched by several ‘washing processes’ which uses the shallow waters to dissolve the un-
wanted carbon dioxide. The end product of about 80% methane, 18% carbon dioxide and 
2% nitrogen is compressed and transported to the brewery by pipeline (<http://www. 
upegaz.gov.rw/faisabilite.html>, accessed 02.12.2006) 
13  UPEGAZ provides a list of 20 studies on Lake Kivu’s methane gas on its website 
(<http://www.upegaz.gov.rw/historique.html>, accessed 02.12.2006). 
14  DANE’s shareholders are two limited companies registered in the British Virgin Islands 
(Ainsley International Limited) and in Cyprus (Selenge Enterprises Limited). Other inves-
tors are the Finnish Wartsila Cooperation that supplies the power generators and operates 
the project and the Israeli Ludan Engineering Company Limited, responsible for the gas 
extraction plant. 
15  Africa Power 2006: 4; INICA n. d. 
16 According to Rwandan newspaper The New Times, the KB1 project now risks to fail 
since DANE didn’t pay its share of the initial investment. The Rwandan government is 
taking DANE to court in this matter and has withdrawn its sub-loan offer for the project 
(The New Times; 1, 9 and 11 February 2007).  
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dan businessmen who are ready to invest over 30 million Euros in a similar 
methane project to be realized with South African technology.17 However, 
further plans go far beyond these 35 MW, which will be easily absorbed by a 
ravenous national energy market. The medium-term aim is to produce 200 
MW and to reach an electrification rate of 30% of all households by 2020.18 
The Rwandan Minister of Energy has even talked about 700 MW,19 a twenty 
fold increase of Rwanda’s current energy production that could make the 
country an important net exporter of affordable power in Central and East 
Africa.  
Surprisingly, one crucial fact is not mentioned in the various scientific 
reports and the extensive coverage of current and future methane gas ex-
traction in the national and international media: Lake Kivu’s methane is a 
common resource shared by Rwanda and the DRC and there is no contract 
granting one of them the exclusive right of exploitation. To generate 35 MW 
it will probably be necessary to extract between 55 and 60 million m³ of 
methane per year, but the methane consumption for a 200 MW scheme (315-
340 million m³ per year) or even a 700 MW scheme (over one billion m³ per 
year) for export purposes, as announced by Rwandan government officials, 
will largely exceed the self-regeneration capacity of Lake Kivu’s methane.20 
What may be welcome with regard to a reduction of a possible gas outburst 
is not unproblematic in view of Rwanda’s involvement in the exploitation of 
eastern Congo’s natural resources during the wars of the last ten years. Even 
if Johnson & Tegera (2005) have shown that the problem of resource exploi-
tation in the DRC is a complex structural problem and thus cannot be re-
duced to ‘illegal’ practices by foreign aggressors, statements like that of the 
Rwandan Minister of Energy are suspiciously watched on the Congolese 
shores of the lake.21 Against this background, power generation using meth-
ane gas from Lake Kivu is an important issue in the recommencing bilateral 
                                            
17  Author’s interview with the chairman of the Rwanda Private Sector Federation (RPSF) 
in Kigali, October 2006. Several companies have expressed interest in gas projects on Lake 
Kivu (e.g. First Trading House, Ixora, Equatoria). German company W+S Beteiligungs AG 
together with Deutsche Montan Technologie GmbH (DTM) seems to be ready to sign a 
$ 100 million contract on methane gas extraction with the Rwandan government 
(<http://presseportal.de/story.htx?firmaid=61635>, accessed 17.01.2007). 
18  Author’s interview with staff members of UPEGAZ in Kigali, October 2006. 
19  BBC News, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4698278.stm>, accessed 21.11.2006. 
20  It is estimated that from 50 to 55 billion m³ of methane about 40 billion are economically 
exploitable. 
21  ‘If Rwanda exploits methane gas from the lake to produce electricity and then wants to 
sell it to us we can’t accept. It’s also our gas, isn’t it?’ Author’s interview with a staff mem-
ber of SNEL in Goma, October 2006. Similar statements were given by other officials as 




relations between Rwanda and the DRC, as well as an element affecting 




Energy projects and a new Great Lakes cooperation 
 
On the international level there are two larger initiatives promoting common 
energy projects explicitly as part of broader approaches to achieving sus-
tainable peace in the Great Lakes region: the International Conference on the 
Great Lakes Region (ICGLR)22 and the faint-heartedly resuscitated Economic 
Community of the Great Lakes Region Countries (Communauté Economique 
des Pays des Grands Lacs, CEPGL).23 The idea behind is to reduce enmity, to 
bolster up mutual dependency, and to provide economic benefits for all 
parties involved.  
On the ICGLR level there is a project for methane gas exploitation and 
the construction of a gas pipeline from Lake Kivu to eastern DRC, Rwanda, 
Burundi, Tanzania and Uganda, but the realisation of this ambitious scheme 
hasn't gone beyond the stage of a proposed feasibility study (ICGLR 2005). 
In view of the enormous need for technical and financial input, as well as 
political commitment and the security aspects of a pipeline that have not yet 
been analysed in detail, it can be assumed that this project will not be real-
ised in the medium term. 
Pushed by former Belgian Foreign Minister Louis Michel, Burundi, the 
DRC and Rwanda announced the relaunch of CEPGL in 2004 and made 
proposals for common rehabilitation projects in respect of the Ruzizi 1 and 
Ruzizi 2 hydropower stations. Since joint exploitation of methane gas has no 
priority, and since the regional Banque de Développement des Etats des Grands 
Lacs (BDEGL), which was intended to manage potential funds for these 
CEPGL projects from the World Bank and the European Union, is virtually 
bankrupt, it is not surprising that Rwanda is spurring on its own methane 
projects in order to overcome its energy crisis as fast as possible.24  
                                            
22  ICGLR is an on-going process for negotiations and consultations on poverty and con-
flict in the sub-region with participants from the government and civil society from the 
participating countries. Assisted by the United Nations and the African Union ICGLR runs 
a temporary office in Nairobi where it also held its second summit in December 2006. The 
heads of State signed the Dar es Salaam Declaration as a call for common programmes of 
action and projects. For further information, see Sebhara 2005 and <http://www.icglr.org>. 
23  CEPGL was founded in 1976. As a result of the different wars in and between the mem-
ber states Burundi, Rwanda and Zaire/DRC in the 1990s, it gradually lost its significance. 
24  There is also dissent within the European Union concerning common projects. In view 
of the insecurity and political instability in the region, one fraction is worried about the loss 
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With SOCIGAZ (Société Commerciale et Industrielle pour la Mise en Valeur 
du Gaz Méthane), Rwanda and the DRC already dispose theoretically of a 
bilateral instrument for the mediation of diverging interests in the methane 
sector. SOCIGAZ was created by the two countries within the CEPGL 
framework in 1990 with the aim of promoting the industrial exploitation of 
methane gas. After the first Congo war (1996-97), SOCIGAZ got a new man-
date and since 1999 it is formally responsible for controlling exploitation, 
concessions and licence fees. But with the reform of SOCIGAZ both states 
now also have the right to assign concessions for their territory, an impor-
tant precondition for Rwanda’s current exploitation project.  
SOCIGAZ is indeed the appropriate organ for cooperation regarding 
the exploitation of methane, but, like other institutions within the CEPGL 
framework, after 10 years of war between the member states and internal 
conflicts within them, at the present time it doesn’t function at all. In reality, 
SOCIGAZ, which according to its charter is always headed by a Congolese 
General Director, serves more or less as the semi-official Congolese contact 
for Rwanda’s Unit for the Promotion and Exploitation of Lake Kivu Gas 
(UPEGAZ) and represents the DRC’s interests in the development of the 
KP1 project.  
Rwanda currently appears to have a sincere interest in the political 
safeguarding of its methane extraction project and in getting the DRC on 
board, which has the same right to Kivu’s methane.25 First bilateral talks 
between the two Ministers of Energy were held in Kigali in December 2005, 
followed by a meeting of experts in April 2006, also in Kigali. Both events 
were organised by UPEGAZ. During these meetings, the Congolese side was 
informed about details of KP1 and provided with different studies on the 
feasibility and potential environmental impacts of methane gas exploitation. 
Congolese fears were discussed regarding the possible impact of falling 
water levels in Lake Kivu, due to methane gas extraction, on the already 
poor performance of Ruzizi 1 and Ruzizi 2 power stations, on which the 
Congolese border region relies heavily.26 Both sides expressed their willing-
ness to cooperate more closely in the future and the Congolese delegation 
declared its support for the KP1 project. However, the Congolese insisted on 
reviving agreements reached during the modification of SOCIGAZ’s man-
                                                                                                 
of investments through potential future conflicts. Author’s interviews with a staff member 
of CEPGL in Gisenyi and a European Union official in Kigali, October 2006.  
25  In 1975 Rwanda and Zaire signed the Bukavu treaty in which the two countries agreed 
on a common exploitation of the gas. Since the problem is about dissolved gas in the depth 
of the lake it is very difficult to number the respective share of methane resources for each 
country, especially if one brings to mind that an extraction is followed by balancing 
through water flows. 




date in 1998 regulating financial compensation in the case of unilateral 
methane exploitation exceeding the self-generation rate.27 
Rwanda, represented by UPEGAZ, claims that it is extremely difficult 
to find reliable and long-term negotiating partners in the DRC, due to am-
biguous and frequently changing competences. Now Rwanda has come up 
with a new initiative for a so-called Lake Kivu Monitoring Programme, 
which is primarily established as a technical controlling, inspecting and 
regulating programme to preserve the lake's stability during large-scale 
industrial methane exploitation. One has to observe whether the initiative 
will also serve as a political platform for negotiations between the riparian 
countries of Lake Kivu and to which extent the government of Rwanda 
wishes the Congolese to participate in it. UPEGAZ proposed a basic plan for 
the programme that envisages a scientific workshop for end of march 2007, 
the elaboration of laws and rules for exploitation, and a baseline survey also 
for 2007. A ‘Kivu Monitoring Group’ shall be integrated in the Nile Basin 






Several open questions remain regarding the future development of indus-
trial methane gas extraction in Lake Kivu. A first one concerns the current 
disaster discourse. As it was pointed out, a huge gas outburst is relatively 
unlikely as long as no significant disturbance of the lake’s stability occurs 
(e.g. strong heat input into the lake). Yet nearly all studies and reports em-
phasise the positive effect of methane exploitation for disaster risk reduc-
tion, even if the annual medium-term volume of exploited gas were to be 
largely inferior to the regeneration rate.29 None the less disaster risk reduc-
tion is also regularly cited by Rwandan officials in order to counter Congo-
lese concerns about their neighbour’s solo attempt in the methane sector.30 
By contrast there is very little discussion about the potential industrial dis-
aster risks of large scale methane exploitation. With the exception of Tietze 
(2000), who mentions the high risk of an accident if extraction is performed 
improperly, most authors and consultants avoid this question. An incident 
                                            
27  Author’s interview with the General Director of SOCIGAZ via telephone, December 2006. 
28  Author’s interview with UPEGAZ staff member in Kigali, October 2006. 
29  An exaggerated disaster vocabulary is very common in the coverage of the methane 
issue. See for example Isager 2006 
30  ‘They should be glad; we’re going to degas the lake’. Author’s interview with govern-
ment official in Kigali, October 2006. 
Lake Kivu’s methane gas 
 
107
during extraction could affect the Congolese population as well and thus 
provoke tension between the two countries. 
The same holds true for potential environmental effects. Whereas 
methane gas is advertised as a substitute for wood, thus stopping deforesta-
tion in Rwanda, methane’s real substitution potential is quite uncertain in 
view of the low prices of wood fuel and the highly dispersed settlement 
structure. Moreover, no environmental study has been carried out to inves-
tigate the impact of destabilisation of the lake on the fish population. Lastly, 
it is not clear what should be done with the by-products of methane exploi-
tation, especially carbon dioxide.31 Pumping it back to depths below 270 m is 
too expensive and would affect the costs. Pumping it to depths between 10 
and 50 m would only delay its release into the atmosphere. If CO2 is com-
pletely released, this would affect methane’s reputation as a ‘green’ alterna-
tive to diesel.  
As already mentioned, the Kivu Monitoring Group is Rwanda’s pro-
posal to address all these problems. But the question is whether it would not 
be more useful to restructure SOCIGAZ and reinforce its capacity as the 
appropriate organ for questions concerning the common use of Lake Kivu’s 
methane deposits, instead of establishing a new institution that is perceived 
as dominated by Rwanda. 
It is obvious that landlocked Rwanda needs to push methane exploita-
tion in order to overcome its current energy crisis. Sufficient and affordable 
power is an important precondition for further development and therefore 
for the fragile stability of the war- and genocide-torn society. In addition, as 
an exporter of power, the country would strengthen its influence in the re-
gional political setting and make an important step forward in its efforts to 
become a member of the East African Community (EAC). But Rwanda is 
caught between a rock and a hard place. It has to further its own methane 
projects but it is also aware that a sustainable and long-term exploitation 
strategy must include the DRC’s interests as well as protect its own rights. 
This is not easy in a situation where official diplomatic relations are still not 
really re-established and tensions continue.32 Against this background, bilat-
eral negotiations in the methane sector appear much more advanced than 
those on a general level, and an often mentioned vision is that common 
methane projects could deepen mutual dependency and acquire the same 
                                            
31  There is four times more carbon dioxide in the water than methane gas.  
32  Rwanda was not invited to President Kabila’s swearing-in ceremony and President 
Kagame confounded DRC’s officials when he expressed his readiness to send troops back 






importance as Ruzizi 2 hydropower station, which was managed jointly 
even in wartime.  
The realisation of potential common projects in the methane sector also 
depends on the condition of the state in the DRC. In this respect one has to 
observe whether President Joseph Kabila can consolidate power after last 
year’s elections and what kind of impact this consolidation will have on 
local political order and the performance of state institutions especially in 
the still Rwandan influenced eastern part of the DRC. Without reliable con-
tacts and stronger commitment from the DRC, real cooperation is impos-
sible. It is also clear that for a lot of Congolese this will cost quite an effort in 
view of the recent history of the two countries. If methane extraction in 
Rwanda works technically and financially and does not adversely affect the 
environment, the DRC would be well advised to develop its own methane 
projects as it is not conceivable that Rwanda will stop exploitation just be-
cause it has already consumed half of Kivu’s methane.  
The political effects of the industrial exploitation of Lake Kivu’s meth-
ane gas and its dynamic institutional framework should be incorporated in 
future research on the regional conflict situation. The possibility of devel-
oping a common strategy for the exploitation of the Lake Kivu methane 
deposit and to ensure that profits are redistributed fairly amongst the parties 
involved is intrinsically tied to the well-known problems of political instabil-
ity which encumber relations between Rwanda and the DRC: the presence of 
the ex-FAR/Interahamwe in the DRC which was used as the justification for 
Rwanda’s decision to send in troops and the situation of the Rwandophone 
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